Gaza's Water Lifeline Is Running Out: 330,000 People at Risk as Trucking Operations Wind Down

Gaza's already fragile water system is approaching a new breaking point. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), since mid-May 2026 four humanitarian partners have begun phasing out water-trucking operations across the Gaza Strip — some have already stopped, others will wind down by mid-June — leaving more than 330,000 people across roughly 250 sites at risk of losing their primary source of drinking water.

The phase-out lands on a population with almost nothing left to fall back on. Nearly 90 percent of Gaza's water and sanitation infrastructure has been destroyed or damaged, and around 80 percent of residents now depend on water trucked in by humanitarian organizations simply to drink, cook, and wash. Strip-wide water production fell by roughly 20 percent in May compared with two months earlier, driven by shortages of treatment chemicals and spare parts needed to keep wells and desalination units running.

A Daily Trade-Off Between Drinking and Disease

UNICEF describes the situation starkly: for many families in Gaza, water shortages now mean choosing between drinking, hygiene, and disease prevention — not all three. Most households cannot meet the minimum benchmark of six litres of water per person per day for drinking and cooking alone, let alone the additional water needed for sanitation.

That shortfall is already translating into measurable health impact. Between late April and the end of May, infectious diseases accounted for one in five medical consultations recorded through the World Health Organization's Early Warning, Alert and Response System in Gaza, with acute respiratory infections the single largest cause of illness. Over the same period, rodent and insect infestations were flagged as the most critical concern across 29 displacement sites in Khan Younis, Deir al Balah, and Gaza City — a direct consequence of solid waste that can no longer be properly collected or disposed of.

Repairs Outpaced by Damage and Access Restrictions

Efforts to fix the underlying infrastructure are running into the same constraints that created the crisis. Strikes and exchanges of fire have repeatedly damaged water and sanitation systems — including the Emirati carrier line, hit on 23 May, and facilities near Al-Aqsa Hospital, damaged five days later. Repair teams report slow progress because the materials needed — pipes, pumps, treatment chemicals — are themselves subject to import restrictions. Since 24 May, Israeli authorities have kept the Zikim Crossing in northern Gaza closed, leaving Kerem Shalom as the only entry point for approved cargo, a bottleneck that slows the arrival of every category of supply, including those needed for water repairs.

Humanitarian partners have not stopped responding in the meantime. A Pest Control Plan launched on 17 May has begun treatment at 1,180 priority locations, including hospitals and food storage sites, and cash-for-work programs have mobilized nearly 7,000 residents to support clean-up across 139 sites. But these remain mitigation measures layered onto a system that is structurally failing — not a substitute for restoring the water and sanitation network itself.

Children Bear the Sharpest Edge

Malnutrition data from early May illustrates how quickly water insecurity becomes a child protection issue. Nearly 38,000 children aged 6 to 59 months were screened for acute malnutrition in the first half of the month; just over 2,000 were found to need treatment, including 737 cases of severe acute malnutrition — conditions that water-borne and water-scarcity-related illness can rapidly worsen in already weakened children.

Ummanitarian's Perspective

For practitioners working in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and emergency public health, Gaza's trajectory is a textbook case of cascading failure: damaged infrastructure, restricted imports, and a phased withdrawal of stop-gap services converging at the same moment. The broader lesson for disaster and humanitarian response planning is that water trucking and similar emergency measures are not a substitute for infrastructure — they buy time, and that time runs out the moment funding, access, or supply chains falter. Where local capacity-building and pre-positioned WASH infrastructure exist, the gap between emergency response and system collapse is wider. In Gaza, that gap is now closing within weeks.